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In two experiments, subjects responded to on-task probes while reading under dual-task
conditions. The secondary task was to monitor the text for occurrences of the letter e. In
Experiment 1, reading comprehension was assessed with a multiple-choice recognition
test; in Experiment 2, subjects recalled the text. In both experiments, the secondary
task replicated the well-known “missing-letter effect” in which detection of e’s was less
effective for function words and the word “the.” Letter detection was also more effective
when subjects were on task, but this effect did not interact with the missing-letter
effect. Comprehension was assessed in both the dual-task conditions and in control
single-task conditions. In the single-task conditions, both recognition (Experiment 1) and
recall (Experiment 2) was better when subjects were on task, replicating previous research
on mind wandering. Surprisingly, though, comprehension under dual-task conditions only
showed an effect of being on task when measured with recall; there was no effect on
recognition performance. Our interpretation of this pattern of results is that subjects
generate responses to on-task probes on the basis of a retrospective assessment of
the contents of working memory. Further, we argue that under dual-task conditions, the
contents of working memory is not closely related to the reading processes required for
accurate recognition performance. These conclusions have implications for models of text
comprehension and for the interpretation of on-task probe responses.
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Mind wandering can be characterized as the allocation of
resources to mental processes unrelated to the current task. In
the present research, we explored this conception of mind wan-
dering by using a dual-task paradigm, a common technique for
indexing the allocation of resources. The primary task was reading
comprehension, and we measured the effectiveness of compre-
hension with either amultiple-choice test (Experiment 1) or recall
(Experiment 2). The secondary task was to monitor the words
being read for the occurrence of the letter e. Although this task
requires the recognition of individual words, it depends on ortho-
graphic processing rather than text comprehension. Thus, letter
detection may interact with comprehension, which in turn may
interact with whether subjects are on or off task. The surpris-
ing result was that there was no relationship between on-task
rating and comprehension when measured with a recognition
test, although this relationship was found under either single-task
conditions or when comprehension was measured by recall. This
result has implications for the nature and measurement of mind
wandering.
The plan of this article is as follows. First, we describe in
more detail our analysis of mind wandering in terms of resource
allocation. Second, this analysis is applied to the mental pro-
cesses involved in reading comprehension, and previous results
are described from this perspective. Third, we describe the letter-
detection task, the missing-letter phenomenon, and how the task
likely relates to reading for comprehension. Fourth, we present
the results of the two experiments comparing the effects of
mind wandering on comprehension under single- to dual-task
conditions. Experiment 1 used a multiple-choice recognition task
to assess memory for the text while Experiment 2 used a recall
task. In both experiments, we used periodic mental-state probes
to assess whether subjects were on or off task. In the Discussion
section, we argue that the pattern of results requires a new analysis
of measures of mind wandering.
MINDWANDERING AS RESOURCE ALLOCATION
While mind wandering, one can superficially conform to the
demands of a task while devoting potentially large amounts of
mental resources to other, unrelated processing. Thus, if one
divides mental processing into that which is task relevant and
that which is task irrelevant, mind wandering consists of devoting
a significant portion of mental resources to task-irrelevant pro-
cessing at the expense of the target task (Smallwood et al., 2011).
On the assumption that one wants to allocate resources to the
current task, allocating resources elsewhere can be regarded as a
failure of executive control (cf. McVay and Kane, 2009). However,
mind wandering might also occur because task-irrelevant goals
are more important, at least momentarily (e.g., Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). Related to this analysis, mind wandering has
been characterized as directing resources to internal thoughts
rather the external stimuli needed to perform a task (Smallwood,
2013). However, in the present research, we were concerned with
minding wandering during the task of reading comprehension,
and in this case the distinction between directing resources to
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external vs. internal information seems incomplete. In reading,
as in many other complex tasks, resources must be directed to the
contents of internal processing as well as external stimuli. Based
on this premise, Dixon and Bortolussi (2013) analyzedmind wan-
dering in text comprehension as part of a more general issue of
resource allocation. Previous research suggests that mind wander-
ing in reading has a surprisingly high prevalence (Schooler et al.,
2004), making an understanding of this aspect of mental process-
ing an important problem in understanding the use of mental
resources in reading.
COMPONENT PROCESSES IN READING
We argue that for the task of reading comprehension, it is sim-
plistic to think that resources are either allocated to the task of
reading or not. Rather, reading consists of a variety of different
component processes, and resources can be allocated differen-
tially among them (cf. Smallwood, 2011; Schad et al., 2012). As a
working heuristic, we distinguish among lexical processes, mean-
ing processes, and situationmodel processes. Lexical processes are
those that use the orthographic information in the text to iden-
tify the word and provide initial access to aspects of the word
meaning. The importance of resource allocation to the lexical
level is highlighted by the classic work of LaBerge and Samuels
(1974). They argued that the development of automatic word
recognition skill among developing readers allowed resources to
be devoted instead to higher-level comprehension processes. For
our purposes, we distinguish two general classes of processes in
reading beyond word recognition. Meaning processes are respon-
sible for constructing a propositional representation of the word
meanings and semantic content, the so-called text base (Kintsch
and Van Dijk, 1978). In this context, the text base refers to the
relationships among concepts and events that are depicted by sen-
tences and referring expressions in the text. Meaning processes
correspond to the construction processes in the Construction-
Integration Model of reading (Kintsch and Welsch, 1991). In
contrast, situation model processes construct a representation of
that to which the text refers. Zwaan et al. (1995) suggested that
the situation model is “a coherent representation of the described
world” (p. 292). It would include, for example, information about
the protagonist’s goals and how they are related to other aspects of
the narrative world, the spatial and temporal relationships among
the entities in the story, and so on. Generally, construction of a
situation model requires inferences based on world knowledge
and personal experience that go beyond the information provided
explicitly by the text.
The three levels of processing—lexical, meaning, and situa-
tion model—interact and build on one another. For example, a
representation of the word meanings is necessary for the con-
struction of the text base, and the text base is necessary for
construction of the situation model. However, the component
processes have different relationships to measures of subsequent
memory. For example, lexical processing may be critical in ver-
batim recall since one must distinguish precisely which word
was read. Meaning processing underlies memory for content.
For example, a representation of the meaning would be involved
if one had to distinguish which of two similar events occurred
in a story. Situation-model processing allows readers to make
inferences in the world described by the text. Because the situa-
tion model provides an organizational memory structure for the
content of the story, it is essential for recall (Ericsson and Kintsch,
1995). Schmalhofer and Glavanov (1986) demonstrated differ-
ential memory for these representations, with verbatim memory
decaying quickly, propositional memory more slowly, and sit-
uation model memory lasting the longest (see also Singer and
Kintsch, 2001).
There is evidence that each of these three components of read-
ing could suffer during mind wandering. According to several
accounts of reading comprehension, lexical processes are assumed
to be largely automatic among skilled readers (e.g., Rayner and
Pollatsek, 1989; Brown et al., 2002; cf. Perfetti, 2007; but see,
e.g., Besner et al., 1997; Risko et al., 2005). Thus, one might
expect that diverting resources to off-task processing while mind
wandering to have relatively little impact on lexical processing.
Indeed, lexical errors introduced into a text are detected with rel-
atively high frequency, despite a propensity of readers to mind
wander (Schad et al., 2012). On the other hand, word frequency
effects are smaller during mind wandering (Reichle et al., 2010;
Franklin et al., 2011; Schad et al., 2012), which might mean that
lexical processes are less complete during mind wandering. Mind
wandering may also produce decrements in either meaning pro-
cessing or situation model processing. For example, Reichle et al.
(2010) found that there were smaller effects of several lexical
and sentential variables on eye fixations during reading when
mind wandering, suggesting that processes that integrated word
meanings into a propositional representation were operating less
effectively. Similarly, Schad et al. (2012), using an objective index
of mind wandering, found smaller sentence wrap-up effects (Just
and Carpenter, 1980) when mind wandering, suggesting that
processes that constructed sentence meaning were curtailed. If
meaning representations were trapped in a subsequent compre-
hension test, decrements due to mind wandering might be found.
Smallwood et al. (2008) argued that mind wandering had its main
effect on the construction of the situation model. When adequate
resources are not devoted to the construction of this representa-
tion, readers may be less able to draw inferences about the events
in the world described by the text. In general, though, because
lexical, meaning, and situation-model processes must interact
extensively, it may be difficult to ascribe effects unambiguously
to any one level.
LETTER DETECTION
In the letter-detection task, subjects are asked to read for compre-
hension while at the same time identifying words with a particular
letter. Although not always discussed as such, this is effectively
a dual-task paradigm in which the comprehension must pro-
ceed at the same time as a novel orthographic task. A great
deal of research using this task has focused on a result origi-
nally reported by Corcoran (1966) that has come to be known
as the “missing-letter effect.” This result is that subjects dis-
proportionately fail to detect letters in high-frequency function
words. An influential explanation of themissing-letter effect is the
Guidance-Organization, or GO, model (Greenberg et al., 2004).
The GO model attributes the effect to a variety of factors, includ-
ing unitization, in which high-frequency words are recognized
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before their constituent letters; parafoveal processing, in which
words are recognized in the parafovea where there is inadequate
acuity to identify individual letters; and contextual constraint, in
which predictable function words need not be processed.
Letter detection and comprehension are related in that both
require identification of the words of the text. However, letter
detection requires attention to the details of the orthography
and additional decision processes that would not otherwise be
invoked (e.g., Saint-Aubin et al., 2003). Similarly, comprehension
requires further processing of the sentence and discourse that is
not required in making letter-detection responses. Although pre-
vious researchers have argued that mind wandering in reading is
associated with less complete processing of the situation model, it
is unclear howmindwandering should affect letter detection. One
intuition is that the missing-letter effect occurs because readers
fail to devote adequate resources to processing the orthographic
level. If this were true, mind wandering should exacerbate the
effect because readers would be even less likely to devote resources
to letter detection. In other words, one might conjecture that
detecting a letter in a high-frequency function word requires
additional, non-automatic processing, and that such resources
would be unavailable while mind wandering.
EXPERIMENT 1
In the present research, we used a version of the on-task probe
technique developed in the context of reading by Schooler et al.
(2004). In this approach, subjects are occasionally interrupted
while reading and asked whether or not they are on-task. Our
implementation of this paradigm is similar to that described by
Dixon and Bortolussi (2013) in which subjects used a computer
mouse to indicate a point on a continuous scale to describe the
extent to which they are on or off task. Thus, our measure of
mind wandering ranges continuously from completely off task to
completely on task.
In order to combine reading comprehension with letter detec-
tion, texts were read word by word on a computer screen. Subjects
advanced from one word to the next by pressing the space bar.
This word-by-word paradigm has been used in a variety of
research on reading (e.g., Aaronson and Scarborough, 1976). In
most situations, subjects readily acquire proficiency in control-
ling the presentation. Many variables that affect eye fixations in
unconstrained reading also affect presentation time in this and
similar paradigms (e.g., Just et al., 1982). When subjects were to
read and to detect the letter e concurrently in the present exper-
iment, they pressed the e key on the keyboard (rather than the
spacebar) if the word being read contained an e. The dual-task
condition also afforded the opportunity to assess whether subjects
were on task with respect to letter detection as well as compre-
hension. Thus, in this condition, when subjects were interrupted,
they were asked to respond to two on-task probes, one concerning
comprehension and one concerning letter detection.
The use of a dual-task condition in this experiment con-
strained how we could assess whether subjects were on task. In
the probe question used by, for example, Smallwood et al. (2007)
and Schooler et al. (2004), subjects were asked directly whether
they were mind wandering. As described above, mind wandering
can be construed as devoting mental resources to task-unrelated
thoughts. Thus, a positive response to such probe questions nec-
essarily entails that resources were not devoted to the target task.
However, in the current dual-task condition, there are two tasks to
which subjects may or may not be devoting resources, and there
may not be a simple relationship between mind wandering and
the resources devoted to either of those tasks. Thus, our approach
was to phrase the probe questions in terms of the target tasks.
In other words, were they devoting resources to comprehension?
And, were they devoting resources to letter detection? While such
probe questions do not mention mind wandering, if mind wan-
dering involves devoting resources to something other than the
target task, the probes should provide the same information as
that obtained in previous investigations.
A critical issue concerns how to assess reading comprehen-
sion. In Experiment 1, we used a multiple-choice test that indexed
memory for relatively superficial details of the text. This type of
test makes fairly minimal demands on the situationmodel readers
might construct; it depends instead more on what concepts were
activated in the course of reading. If mind wandering primar-
ily affects the construction of a situation model (e.g., Smallwood
et al., 2008; Smallwood, 2011), one might expect little relation-
ship between this measure of comprehension and the on-task
probe response. On the other hand, if mind wandering deflects
resources from a variety of reading components, a relationship
might be found.
METHOD
Subjects read an extended, difficult passage word by word. In
the single-task condition, this was the only task; in the dual-task
condition, they concurrently monitored for words containing the
letter e. In both conditions, subjects were periodically probed to
see whether they were on task.
Materials
Subjects read the initial, 2040-word section of the introduction
(MacDonell, 1910) to The Closet of Sir Kenelm Digby Knight
Opened, a seventeenth century cookbook. The text describes the
life and background of Sir Kenelm Digby using relatively difficult
vocabulary and sentence structure. The text was edited slightly to
eliminate a few words that were likely to be confusing to our sub-
jects. It had a Flesch reading index of 59.8. The text was divided
into eight approximately equal sections. The section lengths aver-
aged 255 words, with a range of 194–368, and the section breaks
always coincided with paragraph breaks. An on-task probe was
presented after each section. Sixteen multiple-choice comprehen-
sion questions were presented after completing the reading task.
Each question was based on the gist of a sentence in the second
half of one of the eight sections and was designed to be difficult
to answer unless the corresponding sentence had been under-
stood. There were two questions for each section. As in other
investigations of mind wandering in reading, we assume that the
mental state indexed by the response to the probe question also
applied to the processing of at least some of the text preceding
the probe. However, we cannot be certain how long that mental
state preceded the probe. As a working approximation, we exam-
ined comprehension of material in the second half of the words
read since the preceding probe. Examples of the questions are
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1 | Examples of comprehension questions in Experiment 1.
What best describes Kenelm’s mother?
a. Broken and darkened
b. Warm and caring
c. Witty and cunning
d. Melancholic
According to the narrator, what contributed to the young Kenelm’s career?
a. His restless mind
b. His excellent memory for dates and places
c. His conservative nature
d. His interest in history
Who was one of young Kenelm’s tutors?
a. John Digby, Earl of Bristol
b. Sir Francis Drake
c. Laud, Dean of Gloucester
d. The Archbishop of Canterbury
Answer in bold.
Procedure
In the single-task condition, subjects viewed the text one word at
a time, and the next word was presented each time the spacebar
was pressed. Subjects read silently. Reading time for each word
was measured. At the end of each section, there was a 0.5 s delay,
and then a comprehension on-task probe was presented instead of
the next word in the passage. The probe consisted of the question,
“Were you fully comprehending the story or were you thinking
of something else?” Subjects were informed of the probe ques-
tions at the beginning of the session and were given the following
instructions:
We are also interested in how well people can concentrate on a
task like this over the course of the research session. We are ask-
ing you to read a fairly long passage, and it is perfectly normal
for people to occasionally think about other things rather than
the passage and the task at hand. To check this, periodically the
computer will display a question asking whether or not you are
currently concentrating on reading.
Subjects responded to the probe by clicking with the mouse
somewhere on a 16-cm horizontal line presented under the ques-
tion. The line was marked with five points, labeled from left to
right, “Definitely thinking of something else,” “Thinking of some-
thing else to some extent,” “Not sure,” “Comprehending to some
extent,” and “Definitely comprehending.” Some of the scale labels
have alternative interpretations. For example, one might imagine
selecting “comprehending to some extent” if one were attending
fully to the text but having comprehension difficulties. Similarly,
“not sure” might be symptomatic of being “zoned out” and not
attending to the task at all. However, we believe that the framing of
the probe question as a continuous range from “comprehending”
to “thinking of something else,” as well as the instructions pro-
vided at the beginning of the session, made it clear that subjects
were to estimate the extent to which they are devoting resources
to reading. The dependent probe measure was the position of the
mouse click along the line, measured in pixels from −225 to 225.
The procedure in the dual-task condition was similar.
However, subjects were asked to press the e key on the key-
board to advance to the next word (rather than the spacebar)
if the current word contained an e. On probe trials, a probe
pertaining to the letter-detection task was presented after the
comprehension on-task probe and before continuing with the
passage. (The order of the two probe questions was always the
same.) The letter-detection on-task probe question was, “Were
you carefully watching for e’s or were you thinking of something
else?” Subjects responded with the mouse as before; the response
scale was marked with the labels, “Definitely thinking of some-
thing else,” “Thinking of something else to some extent,” “Not
sure,” “Watching for e’s to some extent,” and “Definitely watching
for e’s.”
Immediately after completing the reading task, subjects were
given the comprehension questions on a printed page. Subjects
answered each item by circling the correct alternative. Subjects
were informed at the beginning of the task of the nature of the
comprehension questions (cf. Postman and Senders, 1946).
Subjects
Subjects were undergraduate volunteers who participated as part
of a Psychology course requirement. There were nine subjects
each in the single- and dual-task conditions. One further sub-
ject in dual-task condition did not complete the comprehension
test, and data from an additional subject in the dual-task con-
dition was not used because the subject failed to follow the
instruction to monitor for e’s. The treatment of subjects, includ-
ing procedures for obtaining informed consent, was approved
by the Arts, Science, and Law Research Ethics Board at the
University of Alberta according to the provisions of the Canadian
Tri-Council Policy Statement, “Ethical Conduct for Research
Involving Humans.”
Analysis
We did not use null-hypothesis significance testing because of
the logical, interpretational, and pragmatic problems with this
practice (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Dixon, 2003; Wagenmakers, 2007).
Instead, we fit models to the data that embodied different possi-
ble interpretations of the results and compared the models using
likelihood ratios. The likelihood ratio indicates the likelihood of
the data given the best fit of one model relative to the likelihood
of the data given the other. Thus, very large (or very small) values
of the likelihood ratio indicate that the fit of onemodel is substan-
tially better than the other. Likelihood ratios are readily calculated
from the summary statistics for a model fit. For example, out-
put from model fits in the environment R (R Development Core
Team, 2012) typically include the log likelihood of the data given
the best fit of themodel. Thus, the likelihood ratio comparing two
models would be:
λ = el1−l2
where l1 and l2 are the log likelihoods of the models under con-
sideration. Following the suggestion of Glover and Dixon (2004),
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the likelihood ratios were adjusted for the differing numbers
of parameters based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC;
Akaike, 1973). The adjustment has the form:
λadj= el1−l2/ek1−k2
where k1 and k2 are the number of parameters in the two models.
Comparing models based on an adjusted likelihood ratio is tanta-
mount to model selection based on AIC values. In particular, an
adjusted likelihood ratio can be calculated directly from the AIC
values commonly provided for model fits, as in:
λadj = exp
(
AIC2 − AIC1
2
)
Burnham and Anderson (2002) refer to this statistic as an evi-
dence ratio. Adjusted likelihood ratios have an intuitive interpre-
tation: After compensating for differential model flexibility, how
much more likely are the data given one interpretation than they
are given the other? In this form, the likelihood ratio provides a
description of the evidence in favor of one model relative to the
other. Thus, it should be intuitively clear when the magnitude of
the likelihood ratio provides strong support for a given model.
However, in some prototypical hypothesis testing situations, an
attained significance level of 0.05 corresponds to an adjusted like-
lihood ratio of∼3.We use the symbolλadj to indicate the adjusted
likelihood ratio.
The models were fit using mixed-effects analysis using the
package lme4 (Bates et al., 2013) in the R environment (R
Development Core Team, 2012). In mixed-effects analysis, one
must explicitly identify the random effects. In analyzing our data,
we assumed that the overall level of the response varied with sub-
jects and, where applicable, text section. Comprehension accuracy
and letter detection performance were analyzed using general-
ized linear models using the binomial family and a logistic link
function as suggested by Dixon (2008).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
On-task probes
Responses to the probes were in pixels (corresponding to the posi-
tion on the response scale that subjects clicked), ranging from
−225 to +225. The mean response for the comprehension on-
task probe was −75.8 (SE = 32.8 across subjects) in the dual-task
condition and 9.0 (SE = 36.1 across subjects) in the single-task
condition. We compared a linear mixed model of the probe
responses that incorporated a difference between the single- and
dual-task conditions to a null model in which both conditions
were assumed to be the same. The comparison indicated that
the former was only slightly better (λadj = 1.74). Thus, there was
little evidence that the responses were higher in the single task
condition. The standard deviation of responses within subjects
was 111.6. The mean response for the letter-detection on-task
probe was −19.1 (SE = 40.5), and the standard deviation within
subjects was 114.1. In order to assess whether there was a relation-
ship between the two on-task responses, a model was constructed
in which comprehension on-task response was predicted as a
function of letter-detection on-task response. There was a weak
positive relationship, and the model was somewhat better than a
null model (λadj = 3.05). Another way to index the relationship
between the two responses is to examine the correlation. However,
in order to remove the contribution of subjects to this correlation,
we first subtracted the mean comprehension response and mean
detection response for each subject from the responses. With this
correction, the correlation between the letter-detection response
and the comprehension response was r = 0.232.
These results provide some confidence that the manipulation
of dual- and single-task conditions did not influence the on-task
probe responses as an index of mind wandering. The overall level
of on-task responses was comparable in the single- and dual-
task conditions, as was the range of responses. Further, subjects
seemed to be able to respond to both the comprehension and
letter-detection on-task probes without any obvious interference.
The relationship between the responses to the two on-task probes
is likely determined by two opposing tendencies: When sub-
jects devote resources to off-task processes, there would be fewer
resources for both comprehension and letter detection, leading
to a positive correlation. On the other hand, resources that are
devoted to on-task processing would need to be split between let-
ter detection and comprehension; in this case, the two tasks may
compete for resources, leading to a negative correlation. On bal-
ance, the modest positive relationship that was obtained is not
surprising.
Comprehension
As described above, accuracy on the comprehension questions
was analyzed in terms of generalized linear mixed-effects mod-
els, an approach tantamount to logistic regression. In the case, the
dependent variable and model parameters are expressed in terms
of log odds correct (i.e., log p/(1 − p), where p is the propor-
tion correct). Accuracy and the corresponding proportion correct
is shown in Table 2. (In these and subsequent tables, the means
and standard errors were calculated by combining the parame-
ter estimates in a full model of the data that includes all effects
and interactions. Proportion correct were then calculated by back
transforming the logit values. The full model was used in order to
provide a detailed and unbiased description of the results even
though our preferred interpretation of the data was typically
simpler.) To assess the evidence for a difference in performance
between the single- and dual-task conditions, a model of accu-
racy as a function task condition was compared to a null model.
There was no evidence that condition had an effect (λadj = 0.38).
Previous research on the letter-detection task has similarly failed
to demonstrate strong interference with comprehension (Oliver
et al., 2005). However, as discussed below, reading is substan-
tially slower in the dual-task condition, and it is possible that
the increase in time is due to the additional work involved in
performing two tasks at the same time.
Comprehension accuracy is shown in Figure 1 as a function of
the probe response. In this analysis, probe response was treated
as a continuous variable, and the figure shows the regression line,
over the interquartile range in each condition, as estimated in the
analysis. The figure suggests that there is a relationship between
comprehension and on-task probe response in the single-task
condition but not in the dual-task condition, even though the
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Table 2 | Comprehension accuracy (and Standard Error) in
Experiment.
Condition Log odds correct Proportion correct
Single task 0.195 (0.191) 0.548 (0.047)
Dual task 0.300 (0.191) 0.574 (0.046)
range of probe responses in the two conditions is comparable.
In order to assess the evidence for a difference in relationship
between comprehension and on-task probe response, we began
with a model of accuracy that included only the effect of con-
dition. We compared that to a model that also included the
comprehension on-task probe response as a predictor only in the
single-task condition. The latter model was better (λadj = 5.08),
providing evidence for a relationship between comprehension
and mind wandering when subjects only have to focus on com-
prehension. We then compared this model to one that also
included probe response as a predictor in the dual-task condition.
There was no evidence that adding this predictor improved the
model (λadj = 0.44). There was modest evidence that the effect
of on-task probe was different in the two conditions: A model
that included the interaction between probe response and con-
dition was better than a model that included only a maineffect
of probe response (λadj = 3.85). In order to provide evidence
that there was little effect of the on-task probe in the dual-task
condition, we compared a model in which the effect of on-task
probe response in the dual task condition was set to 0 to one in
which it was constrained to be at least 0.0018 logits/pixel, that
is, half the size of the effect in the single-task condition. The lat-
ter model provided a clearly better fit (λadj = 5.10). Finally, for
the dual-task condition, there was no evidence that comprehen-
sion was related to the probe response for the letter-detection
task (λadj = 0.73; the slope estimated in the model was 0.0020
logits/pixel, SE = 0.0015).
As another description of the pattern of results, confidence
intervals were generated with parametric bootstrapping. We
started with the best-fitting model in which the effect of probe
response could differ in the two conditions and then generated
1000 random samples based on that model. The model was then
refit to each of these new datasets, and the resulting sample of
parameter estimates was used to estimate confidence intervals.
Based on this procedure, the 95% confidence interval for the
effect of probe response in the dual-task condition was −0.0036
to 0.0019 logits/pixel. This interval is consistent with the model
comparison described above that suggested that the effect of
probe response in the single-task condition was not substantial.
More critically, the 95% confidence interval for the difference
between the effect of probe response in the single- and dual-task
condition was 0.0035–0.0088 logits/pixel. This interval does not
contain zero and is consistent with the previous model compari-
son that provides evidence for a larger effect of probe response in
the single-task condition. On balance, although we cannot dis-
count the possibility that there is a modest effect of the probe
response in the dual-task condition, the results indicate at least
that such an effect cannot be large. Further, the pattern of results
is consistent with an interpretation in which comprehension is a
FIGURE 1 | Comprehension accuracy in Experiment 1 as a function of
condition and comprehension on-task probe response. The slope and
standard error is indicated for each regression line. Each line is drawn over
the interquartile range of the probe response.
function of on-task response in the single-task condition is larger
than that in the dual-task condition.
The relationship between reading comprehension and mind
wandering (as measured by on-task probes) has been docu-
mented in a number of previous studies, including Schooler
et al. (2004); Smallwood et al. (2008), and Dixon and Bortolussi
(2013). Thus, the results for the single-task condition provides
a convergent replication using a word-by-word reading method.
A similar result was reported by Franklin et al. (2011): Subjects
who reported more off-task episodes in a word-by-word read-
ing paradigm had lower comprehension scores. This finding is
valuable because previous accounts of mind wandering in read-
ing have often assumed that the control of eye movements was
relatively automatic and could proceed without active involve-
ment when mind wandering. However, the present requirement
of pressing the space bar to advance to the next word would
not have the same degree of practice and naturalness. Yet the
relationship between comprehension and on-task rating was still
observed. Consequently, one must conclude that comprehension
can suffer from the lack of resources even when the movement
from word to the next is actively controlled.
In contrast to the single-task results, the failure to find strong
evidence for this relationship under dual-task conditions is sur-
prising. It seems unlikely that this result occurred because the
dual-task condition requires allocatingmore resources to reading.
If this were the case, one might have expected to find generally
higher on-task responses in the dual-task condition, but there
was little evidence for such a difference. One might also conjec-
ture that the task demands of the letter-detection task required
resources to be allocated to word identification, and that this
additional resource allocation was sufficient to answer the com-
prehension on-task probes. However, if this were the case, one
might have expected that comprehension would be related to on-
task rating for the letter-detection task, and this did not seem
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Table 3 | “e” Response rate (and Standard Error) as a function of word
type in Experiment 1.
Content Function words “the”
words (excluding “the”)
Log odds false
alarms
−3.176 (0.050) −3.288 (0.050)
Proportion
false alarms
0.040 (0.002) 0.036 (0.002)
Log odds hits 1.348 (0.039) 0.974 (0.048) 0.707 (0.052)
Proportion hits 0.794 (0.006) 0.726 (0.009) 0.670 (0.011)
to be the case either. As well, there is some reason to suspect
that word recognition occurs even during mind wandering (e.g.,
Reichle et al., 2010). As we argue in the General Discussion, this
pattern of results may require a deeper analysis of how subjects
respond to on-task probes.
Letter detection
The tendency to make false alarms and hits on content words,
function words, and the word “the” is shown in Table 3 in terms
of the log odds of an “e” response (and the corresponding propor-
tion). Models were fit to the false alarms and the hits separately.
For false alarms, we compared a null model to one that included
a difference between content and function words. However, the
comparison yielded no evidence for an effect of word type
(λadj = 0.69). The data for hits, however, clearly demonstrated
the missing-letter effect: hit rate was lower for function words
relative to content words and lower still for the word “the.” In
particular, a model that included a difference between content
and function words was substantially better than the null model
in which no difference was predicted (λadj > 1000), and a model
that further included a decrease in hit rate for the word “the” was
better still (λadj = 23.29).
In order to assess the extent to which performance varied with
on-task probe response for the letter-detection task, we examined
words in the second half of each section delimited by the probes.
These results are shown in Figure 2. In general, detection accu-
racy improved with higher probe responses, as shown by both
an increase in hits and a decrease in false alarms. However, these
trends did not interact with word type. For both false alarms and
hits, a model that included probe response and word type was
substantially better than a model that included word type alone
(λadj > 1000 in both cases). There was no evidence that adding
the interaction with word type improved the model in either case
(λadj = 0.42 for false alarms; λadj = 0.31 for hits).
These results replicate the well-known missing-letter effect as
found, for example, by Healy (1976) and Greenberg and Koriat
(1991). Critically, the results show little evidence for an interac-
tion with on-task rating. In other words, there is just as much
of a tendency to miss the letter e in function words when sub-
jects are on task as when they are mind wandering. This means
that the missing letter effect cannot be attributed to a failure to
devote adequate resources to the orthographic level. An alterna-
tive interpretation is that the effect is inherent in the nature of
the representations used to perform the task. For example, word
FIGURE 2 | “e” detection hits and false alarms as a function of word
type and detection on-task probe response in Experiment 1. The slope
and standard error is indicated for each regression line. Each line is drawn
over the interquartile range of the probe response.
recognition processes may be assumed to be largely automatic
among skilled readers (Rayner and Pollatsek, 1989), and lexical
processing may proceed in the same fashion regardless of how
resources are allocated (cf. Brown et al., 2002). However, the rep-
resentation of the content and function words produced by lexical
processing may differ in the extent to which they provide access
to the component letters. This is in keeping with the “unitization”
account of the effect (Healy, 1994) and with some of the tenets of
the GO model. Unlike other aspects of the GO model, the effect
observed here cannot be attributed to skipping function words
that are recognized in the periphery because all words are pre-
sented at fixation (see also Roy-Charland et al., 2009). Similarly,
the present results suggest that the missing-letter effect should
not be attributed to attention to the letter level as such, since it
does not interact with the allocation of resources as indexed by
the on-task probes.
Our interpretation is that on-task probe response provides an
index of the resources allocated to the decision process required
by the e/no-e response made for every word. When resources
are devoted to this decision process (i.e., when subjects are on
task), detection accuracy increases; moremisses occur when fewer
resources are devoted to the decision process. An interesting
aspect of these results is that a failure to attend to the detection
task is associated not only with a decrease in the detection hit
rate, but also with an increase in the false alarm rate. This sug-
gests that allocating insufficient resources to the decision process
leads to poorer discrimination between the two possible types of
stimuli (i.e., words with e’s and those without), rather than simply
a failure to perform the task.
Reading time
Reading time per word is shown for the single- and dual-task con-
ditions as a function of word type in Table 4. Reading was much
faster in the single-task condition, and a model that incorporated
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Table 4 | Reading time per word in seconds (and Standard Error) as a
function of condition and word type in Experiment 1.
Word type Single-task condition Dual-task condition
Content 0.389 (0.027) 0.728 (0.027)
Function 0.376 (0.027) 0.627 (0.027)
FIGURE 3 | Reading time per word as a function of word type and
comprehension on-task probe response in Experiment 1. The slope and
standard error is indicated for each regression line. Each line is drawn over
the interquartile range of the probe response.
this effect was much better than the null model (λadj > 1000).
Oliver et al. (2005) found comparable results on reading time
even without the present word-by-word reading time constraints.
In the slower dual-task condition, content words were read more
slowly than function words. Adding this effect improved the
model substantially (λadj > 1000). However, there was little evi-
dence for an effect of word type in the single-task condition; that
is, adding an effect of word type in the single task condition did
not improve the model appreciably (λadj = 1.41).
The relationship between reading time and on-task probe
response was examined for words in the last half of each section.
In the single task condition, there was tendency for reading time
to decrease as on-task rating increased (λadj = 5.30). A similar
effect was observed by Franklin et al. (2011) using a word-by-
word reading paradigm. (However, Reichle et al. (2010) found
the opposite result—slower reading while mind wandering—
under more naturalistic reading conditions.) There was no such
trend for the dual-task condition (λadj = 0.52). These trends are
illustrated in Figure 3.
The reading times illuminate some aspects of how readers
coordinate the task of reading comprehension with the task of
detecting letters. As discussed previously, the on-task probes for
comprehension and letter detection do not provide a strong indi-
cation of a tradeoff between the two tasks in the dual-task con-
dition; in fact, there was a weak, positive relationship. However,
performing both tasks together clearly involves more work, and
the reading times reflect that: Reading time was much faster in the
single-task condition. We hypothesize that there is an additional
decision and response selection process that is added for each
word in the dual-task condition, and these processes consume an
additional several hundred milliseconds.
Although reading times in the dual-task condition were
shorter for function words than for content words, both types of
words were substantially slower than reading times in the single-
task condition. Thus, it would be difficult to argue that there was
insufficient time to identify the letters in the word under dual-task
conditions. This is consistent with our previous argument that
the missing-letter effect derives from the nature of the represen-
tation of the recognized words, not the resources or time devoted
to making a letter-detection decision about that representation.
EXPERIMENT 2
The surprising failure to find a relationship between mind
wandering and comprehension under dual-task conditions in
Experiment 1 may be related to the nature of the comprehension
measure. Indeed, as mentioned previously, recognition memory
might be based on the results of meaning processing, and it
is often assumed that mind wandering interferes with the con-
struction of a situation model, not meaning processing (e.g.,
Smallwood et al., 2008). In particular, we conjecture that the
comprehension items used in Experiment 1 tapped a relatively
superficial representation of the text, and, inmany cases, the items
could have been answered correctly if subjects recognized a word
or phrase. Thus, a situation model often would not be needed
for a correct response. If this analysis is correct, the relationship
between on-task rating and comprehension should re-emerge
using a measure of comprehension that taps the reader’s situ-
ation model rather than recognition of semantic content. This
might be done, for example, by carefully designing multiple-
choice questions to interrogate inferences and relationships that
were not explicitly stated and would only be available in the situ-
ation model. However, Dixon and Bortolussi (2013) argued that
measuring passage recall was more likely to be based on the sit-
uation model representation than recognition memory because
it requires an organized and articulated representation of the
story world events (see also Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995). This
hypothesis was tested in Experiment 2.
METHOD
Procedure
The presentation of the text was precisely the same as in
Experiment 1, and, for the dual-task subjects, the letter-detection
task was performed in the same manner. After reading the text,
subjects were provided with a computer document in the Apple
TextEdit program with the instruction to type a summary of the
story, including as much detail as possible. There was no limit on
the time taken to produce the summary. Subjects were informed
at the outset that they would have to write a summary of the
passage.
Subjects
Subjects were paid volunteers recruited from undergraduate
Psychology classes at the University of Alberta. There were 19
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subjects in the both the dual- and the single-task conditions.
However, data from one dual-task subject was omitted because
of a false alarm rate of over 80% on the letter-detection task.
The treatment of subjects, including procedures for obtaining
informed consent, was approved by the Arts, Science, and Law
Research Ethics Board at the University of Alberta according to
the provisions of the Canadian Tri-Council Policy Statement,
“Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans.”
Analysis
Reading time and e detection were analyzed as in Experiment 1.
Recall performance was scored by first dividing each recall proto-
col into statements. Each statement generally consisted of a single
clause from the protocol but omitting those that had little to do
with the content of the text (e.g., “I think”). Verb forms that
did not entail a separate clause but which nevertheless referred
to a distinct event in the story were also considered statements
(e.g., “being knighted by Prince Charles.”) A liberal criterion was
adopted for scoring the recall statements: A statement was omit-
ted only if the information was completely incorrect or if it was
so general that it could be attributed to any section in the text
(e.g., “The excerpt from the novel talked quite favorably of this
Kenelem Digby gentlemen”). We then counted, for each half sec-
tion of the text, the number of statements that could have been
based on the information from that portion of the text. (Because
some statements could have been based on the material from
several different places in the text, the total of these counts was
larger than the number of statements.) The parsing into state-
ments and the attributions to section was done independently by
two research assistants and discrepancies were resolved in con-
sultation with the first author. The count data were analyzed
using generalized linear models using the Poisson family and a log
link function. (This analytical technique is often recommended
for count data; e.g., Zuur et al., 2009). Thus, the comprehen-
sion dependent variable and associated model parameters are
expressed in terms of log counts.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
On-task probes
The mean response for comprehension on-task probe (in pixels)
was 35.6 (SE = 17.0 across subjects) in the dual-task condition
and 34.4 (SE = 27.35 across subjects) in the single-task condi-
tion. The standard deviation of responses within subjects was
96.0. The mean response for the letter-detection on-task probe
was 83.7 (SE = 15.6 across subjects), and the standard deviation
within subjects was 80.3. There was clear evidence for a posi-
tive relationship between the letter-detection responses and the
comprehension responses (λadj = 8.94). After controlling for the
mean response level for each subject, the correlation between the
letter-detection response and the comprehension response was
0.372.
Recall
The number of recall statements based on each section is shown
in Table 5, both as a log count (derived from the fit of the gen-
eralized linear model) and the corresponding raw counts. There
was no evidence for higher recall in the single-task condition
(λadj = 0.70).
The relationship between recall and comprehension on-task
probe was examined by looking at the number of recall statements
based on material in the last half of each section. Figure 4 shows
the results of this analysis, treating probe response as a continuous
variable. The figure shows the regression lines in each condi-
tion, over the respective interquartile range, as estimated in the
generalized linear mixed-effects analysis. A model in which the
probe response predicted accuracy in the single-task condition
was better than a model that only included the effect of condi-
tion (λadj = 27.30). There was also strong evidence for an effect
of the probe response in the dual-task condition (λadj > 1000).
Indeed, there was good evidence that the effect in the dual-task
condition was actually larger than that in the single-task condi-
tion (λadj = 110.89). In the dual-task condition, there was no
evidence that comprehension was related to the probe response
for the letter-detection task (λadj = 1.04). Thus, the results show
that comprehension improved with on-task rating in both the
single-task and the dual-task conditions.
The results replicate previous findings that recall is better when
subjects are on task. For example, Dixon and Bortolussi (2013)
found a similar relationship between on-task probe response and
recall. Unlike the results for recognition memory in Experiment
1, however, this result was even stronger in the dual-task condi-
tion than in the single-task condition. Thus, it seems clear that
the unexpected result in Experiment 1 was due to the nature of
Table 5 | Recall statements per section (and Standard Error) in
Experiment 2.
Single-task condition Dual-task condition
Log count 1.269 (0.061) 1.129 (0.061)
Count 3.56 (0.22) 3.09 (0.19)
FIGURE 4 | Comprehension accuracy in Experiment 2 as a function of
condition and comprehension on-task probe response. The slope and
standard error is indicated for each regression line. Each line is drawn over
the interquartile range of the probe response.
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the memory measure. Of course, this does not explain why the
relationship with on-task probe should interact with single-/dual-
task; this issue is taken up in the General Discussion.
A potential concern with this interpretation is that the failure
to find a relationship between probe and recognition accuracy in
Experiment 1 may have been due to the smaller sample and hence
lower power of that experiment. In order to address this issue,
we analyzed the memory results from the dual-task condition of
both experiments together. However, a problem in performing
such an analysis is that the dependent measures in the two exper-
iments are different: Each probe response in Experiment 1 was
associated with two multiple choice items (each of which could
be correct or incorrect), while each probe response in Experiment
2 was associated with a recall statement count. To put the two
dependent variables on the same scale, we coded memory perfor-
mance for each probe in both experiments as either high or low.
High performance in Experiment 1 was defined as getting both
multiple choice items correct; high performance in Experiment 2
was defined as recalling more than 2 statements from the mate-
rial prior to the probe. Although there is no reason to think
that the overall level of high performance using these criteria
should be similar in the two experiments, the index should allow
a meaningful comparison of the effect of probe response across
experiments.
Analysis of high vs. low comprehension in the dual-task condi-
tions was done by fitting generalized mixed-effects models using
the binomial family and a logistic link function. A model that
included an overall effect of probe response was better than a
model that included merely the effect of experiment (λadj =
7.09). However, a model that included an interaction with experi-
ment was substantially better (λadj > 1000). In particular, adding
an effect of probe for Experiment 2 alone lead to a substantial
improvement in the model (λadj > 1000), but there was no fur-
ther improvement when the probe response for Experiment 1 was
added (λadj = 0.68). In contrast, a similar analysis of the single-
task conditions in the two experiments provided evidence for
an overall effect of probe (λadj = 7.68) but no evidence for an
interaction with experiment (λadj = 0.48). Thus, there is good
evidence that in the dual-task conditions, the effect of probe on
memory was larger in Experiment 2 (using a recall measure) than
in Experiment 1 (using a recognition measure). The differential
results in the two experiments cannot be attributed to a difference
in power.
Letter detection
The tendencies to make false alarms and hits on content words,
function words, and the word “the” are shown in Table 6 in terms
of log odds of an e response (as well as the corresponding propor-
tions). Models were fit to the false alarms and the hits separately.
For false alarms, there was no evidence for a difference between
content and function words (λadj = 0.38). The data for hits, how-
ever, clearly demonstrated the missing-letter effect, with a lower
hit rate for function words relative to content words. Amodel that
included a difference between content and function words was
substantially better than the null model in which no difference
was predicted (λadj > 1000). However, there was little evidence
for a further decrease in hits for the word “the” (λadj = 1.28).
In order to assess the extent to which letter detection varied
with letter-detection on-task probe response, we examined words
in the second half of each section delimited by the probes. These
results are shown in Figure 5. In general, the hit rate improved
with higher probe responses, although there was little effect on
false alarms. For hit rates, a model that included word type was
substantially better than a model that only included word type
(λadj > 1000). There was no evidence that the effect of probe
interacted with word type (λadj = 1.01). For false alarms, there
was no evidence of an effect of on-task probe (λadj = 0.47) and
no evidence for an interaction between probe response and word
type (λadj = 0.37).
The results for the letter-detection task in Experiment 2 dif-
fer somewhat from those in Experiment 1. Generally, subjects
reported being on task to a greater degree, and there was a much
more restricted range for the probe responses. Overall, perfor-
mance was better. Subjects in this experiment were recruited
differently at a different time of the academic year, and we
suspect that they generally had a higher degree of motivation
than the subjects in Experiment 1. This difference in sam-
pling may have been responsible for the higher level of perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, the overall pattern was the same: Detection
Table 6 | “e” Response rate (and Standard Error) as a function of word
type in Experiment 2.
Content Function words “the”
words (excluding “the”)
Log odds false alarms −3.852 (0.049) −3.882 (0.049)
Proportion false alarms 0.021 (0.001) 0.020 (0.001)
Log odds hits 2.487 (0.034) 1.716 (0.039) 1.598 (0.042)
Proportion hits 0.923 (0.002) 0.848 (0.005) 0.831 (0.006)
FIGURE 5 | “e” detection hits and false alarms as a function of word
type and detection on-task probe response in Experiment 2. The slope
and standard error is indicated for each regression line. Each line is drawn
over the interquartile range of the probe response.
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performance increased with on-task rating, but the missing-letter
effect was obtained regardless of whether or not subjects indi-
cated they were on task. Although an effect of on-task rating
was found for false alarms in Experiment 1, no such relation-
ship was found here. This may be ascribed to both the very low
level of false alarms as well as the restricted range of on-task
ratings.
Reading time
Reading time per word is shown for the single- and dual-task con-
ditions as a function of word type in Table 7. Reading was much
faster in the single-task condition, and a model that incorporated
this effect was much better than the null model (λadj > 1000).
Content words were read more slowly than function words in
both conditions (λadj > 1000), but this effect was much larger in
the dual-task condition (λadj > 1000).
The relationship between reading time and on-task probe
response was examined for words in the last half of each section.
In both conditions, reading time for function words decreased
as on-task rating increased (λadj > 1000). However, there was
no evidence for any change in reading time for content words
(λadj = 0.44). These trends are illustrated in Figure 6.
The reading time results are broadly consistent with those
from Experiment 1: Reading times were substantially slower in
the dual-task condition, and the difference between content and
Table 7 | Reading time per word in seconds (and Standard Error) as a
function of condition and word type in Experiment 2.
Word type Single-task condition Dual-task condition
Content 0.509 (0.021) 0.767 (0.021)
Function 0.454 (0.021) 0.642 (0.021)
FIGURE 6 | Reading time per word as a function of word type and
comprehension on-task probe response in Experiment 2. The slope and
standard error is indicated for each regression line. Each line is drawn over
the interquartile range of the probe response.
function words was substantially smaller in the single-task condi-
tion. As argued previously, subjects in this experiment seemed to
be more motivated than those in Experiment 1, and possibly they
devoted more effort to performing the task. This may have lead
to the slower reading times in the single-task condition and the
larger effect of word type in that condition. The pattern of read-
ing times is consistent with the idea that readers process words less
fully when they are off task (cf. Reichle et al., 2010; Schad et al.,
2012). In the present context, this could have produced a smaller
difference between function and content words.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of these experiments bear on three issues: the inter-
pretation of on-task probes, the allocation of resources in reading
comprehension, and the nature of the missing-letter effect in
letter detection. Each will be discussed in turn.
ON-TASK PROBES
Our interpretation of the present results rests on the assump-
tion that subjects do not have direct access to how resources have
been recently allocated. Instead, we argue that resource allocation
is a largely unconscious mechanism that responds to the con-
stantly changing demands of the situation and current processing.
Although deliberate intentions certainly matter in resource allo-
cation, they do not completely determine allocation; other factors
are important as well and may alter resource allocation on a
moment-to-moment basis. Indeed, the phenomenon of “zoning
out” while reading, even though the primary goal is to understand
the text, indicates that resource allocation is not inevitably tied to
deliberate goals. If, as we argue, resource allocation is generally
unconscious and unavailable to introspection, responding to on-
task probes requires some form of inference. Our hypothesis is
that readers solve this inferential problem in reading by assess-
ing the contents of working memory. In particular, if they find
that working memory contains detailed and elaborate informa-
tion about the situation described by the text, they may infer that
they must have been on task. On the other hand, if the repre-
sentation text is relatively impoverished, they may conclude that
they were mind wandering. This interpretation ties the on-task
response to well-understood processes in working memory with-
out assuming that readers have a special insight into their mental
state at any given point in time. Moreover, this analysis provides
an account of the pattern of results across the two experiments
and two reading conditions, as discussed below.
RESOURCES IN READING
A complex task such as reading requires the coordination of
resource allocation to a range of different processes. As outlined
in the introduction, this idea has been articulated by LaBerge
and Samuels (1974), Just and Carpenter (1992), and Dixon and
Bortolussi (2013), among others. In the interpretation of the
present results, it is important to distinguish among resources
allocated to processes that construct a meaning representation
from those that construct a situation model. Further, we assume
that the memory measures in Experiment 1 and 2 are differen-
tially affected by the processing of meaning and by the processing
of the situation model. In particular, recall seems likely to depend
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heavily on a well-developed situation model (e.g., Ericsson and
Kintsch, 1995). Together with the argument made previously that
on-task probes index the richness of the situation model rep-
resentation in working memory, this analysis easily explains the
recall results in Experiment 2: Subjects report being on task when
they have an elaborate situation model, and that situation model
allows them to recall information from the text.
According to this analysis, it is not surprising that recog-
nition performance in the dual-task condition of Experiment
1 failed to show a relationship with on-task probe response.
Because the recognition task required only a superficial under-
standing of the material and many items could be answered
by recognizing a particular concept or event, there is no rea-
son to expect the representation of the situation model to
predict comprehension performance. This argument does not
mean that recognition would always be accurate—for many
recognition items, the relevant concept or event may be insuf-
ficiently active to distinguish it from the foils. Rather, the claim
is that this activation is not directly indexed by the quality of
the situation model representation. From this perspective, the
aspect of Experiment 1 that is more surprising is that there
was such a relationship in the single-task condition. Our inter-
pretation, though, is that under these conditions, there is a
correlation between the allocation of resources to meaning rep-
resentations and allocation to the situation model. Generally,
when a reader is off task, fewer resources would be allocated to
both; when a reader is on task, more resources would be allo-
cated to both. Thus, the nature of the situation model would
provide a reasonable index of subsequent recognition memory,
despite the fact that the on-task probes are not indexing pre-
cisely the mental content that is relevant for subsequent memory.
In contrast, in the dual-task condition, when resources are not
allocated to the situation model, they might instead be allo-
cated to the processes involved in letter detection. In particular,
word meanings may be activated in the course of performing
the letter detection task, and the activation of these concepts
could provide a basis for performing the subsequent recogni-
tion test, even if the situation model representation is relatively
impoverished.
Dixon and Bortolussi (2013) provided converging evidence for
this analysis by probing not just whether or not readers were
on task, but also whether or not they were deeply involved with
the story world. Again, this response would have to be made
by interrogating the contents of working memory. However, this
“involvement” probe question is arguably more germane to the
nature of the situation model in working memory andmight pro-
vide a better index of the extent and detail of this representation.
In keeping with this assumption, Dixon and Bortolussi found
that the involvement probe was more closely related to subse-
quent recall than the on-task probe. In other words, both on-task
and involvement responses required inferences, but the inferences
required to make involvement responses provided a better index
of the information used in recall.
The idea that on-task probe responses are inferences has
implications beyond the current pattern of results. One such
implication is that if some other variable affects the content of
working memory, it may affect the responses readers make to
on-task probes even if there is no effect on resource allocation.
For example, if the reader has extensive background knowledge
relevant to a text, the situation model is likely to be more detailed
and elaborate, and he or she may be less likely to report being
off task given the same pattern of resource allocation. Interest
value of the text may operate similarly. Although it is certainly
plausible to assume that more interesting texts will lead to lower
rates of mind wandering, it is possible that more interesting texts
lead to more detailed situation model representations for other
reasons and consequently a higher rate of reporting being on
task. In tasks other than reading comprehension, subjects may
make inferences about being on task using different sources of
information. For example, in the SART task, subjects may decide
that they were mind wandering if they can recall missing tar-
gets. Consequently, any manipulation that makes the errors more
memorable should increase the rate of reported mind wander-
ing. Another example is listening to lectures (Risko et al., 2011);
in this case, subjects may make on-task inferences by assessing
whether they have a coherent representation of the lecture con-
tent. If subjects adopted such a strategy, more organized material
might lead to lower rates of reported mind wandering. The over-
arching conclusion is that one cannot assume that there is a
simple relationship between on-task ratings and the allocation of
resources.
THE MISSING-LETTER TASK
To our knowledge, the on-task probe technique has not been
previously combined with the letter-detection task. The most
important finding for accounts of the missing-letter effect is that
mind wandering impairs letter detection but does not affect the
magnitude of the effect. This result is consistent with analyses
of the task that depend on the nature of the activated word
representation. Consistent with the unitization mechanism pro-
posed by Healy (1994) and as incorporated in the GO model
(Greenberg et al., 2004), we assume that the word representations
generated in reading may not contain detailed information about
constituent letters, particularly if the words are high-frequency
function words. In the present experiments, devoting resources
to the letter-detection task does not change this; it merely means
that the readers will make better decisions concerning that repre-
sentation. This produces a higher hit rate and (in Experiment 1)
a lower false alarm rate.
An important control condition for the missing-letter effect is
to scan lists of unrelated words for a particular letter. Healy (1976)
found that when subjects read scrambled text, a missing-letter
effect was still obtained, consistent with the argument that the
role of function words in well-formed sentences was not essen-
tial to observe the effect. This is consistent with the unitization
mechanism and our interpretation of the present data. Broadly
speaking, we argue that the orthography of function words is less
salient in the initial representation produced by lexical processes.
Following from this logic, we predict that the pattern of results
obtained here would also be observed with scrambled text or in
other conditions in which readers need not process the content
of sentences. In particular, we would expect to see a relationship
between letter-detection accuracy and the response to on-task
probes but no interaction with the missing-letter effect. As here,
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the effect should be observed regardless of whether subjects report
being on task or not.
An innovation in the current investigation of the missing-
letter effect is the use of generalized linear models to examine
the interactions with on-task probe. Similar to logistic regres-
sion techniques, this approach is immune to the types of scaling
artifacts that arise in the analysis of proportion correct (Everitt,
2001; Dixon, 2008). In some previous research on the missing-
letter effect, an interaction with the magnitude of the effect was
obtained largely because the manipulation affected the overall
level of performance, and the magnitude of the missing-letter
effect may have been influenced by such scaling effects (e.g.,
Saint-Aubin et al., 2010).
CONCLUSIONS
Because mind wandering involves the allocation of resources
to task-unrelated processes, it is useful to analyze performance
under conditions that require subjects to perform more than a
single task. The present results inform our understanding of the
on-task probe technique, the allocation of resources to the multi-
ple components of reading comprehension, and the nature of the
representations used in the letter-detection task.
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